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Has Aid Helped in Pakistan? 
 
SHAHRUKH RAFI KHAN 
This paper has a two-fold objective: first, to examine the terms on which Pakistan 
receives aid and whether its debt situation is sustainable, and second, to examine the 
impact of aid and debt on economic growth. It is found that there is little encouraging 
that can be said about how the terms on which Pakistan has received aid over time have 
changed, and its current debt situation is not sustainable. Also reported is the analysis 
done elsewhere which shows that aid has a negative (Granger) causal impact on GDP, 
and aid has a robust negative impact on economic growth after controlling for supply-
side shocks. We provide various reasons for this negative association. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Aid theory in early years of thinking on economic development was 
straightforward. The developing countries were perceived to be in need of substantial 
investments in infrastructure and capital which could not be financed internally. 
According to the traditional two-gap theory, aid was necessary to bridge both the 
savings-investment gap and the trade gap in developing countries and was thus 
considered indispensable.  Aid was advocated for establishing the preconditions for 
growth by strengthening institutions and building infrastructure and for enhancing 
growth via resources for investment.  The increase in economic activity generated by 
aid supported investments was expected to increase output growth, eventually 
generating enough income to render aid superfluous.  
Ridell (1987) and White (1992) present rich reviews of the long and as yet 
unresolved debates. For applied economists, the message is that most attempts at 
assessing the impact of aid on saving, investment and growth suffer from various flaws. 
These include unresolved theoretical issues, faulty data, particularly for cross-country 
analysis, specification errors that call into question the scientific rigor of the findings 
and the difficulty in modelling the mechanisms via which aid actually impacts various 
macroeconomic variables including growth.
1  
These reviews and the conclusions they reach would give pause to applied 
economists seeking to empirically test the aid-growth association as we do in this paper. 
We proceed because our contention is that causality and sensitivity tests, that have been 
used elsewhere, can make a contribution to the empirical debate on the association of 
aid with economic growth. The method used in this paper is straightforward and time 
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1Empirical research in Pakistan by Kemal (1992); Chisti and Hasan (1992); Khan and Rahim 
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series data for other countries are readily available in the sources cited; thus the research 
done for this paper could easily be replicated for other countries, given the availability 
of some specific country knowledge. 
  In the next section, we review how the terms of aid have been changing over 
time in Pakistan.  In the third Section three, we present the findings and we end with a 
discussion of the findings.
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2.  AID TERMS AND STRUCTURE OF DEBT 
While Pakistan’s foreign debt is large (20.4 billion in 1993 in nominal terms), 
and has been growing rapidly (at an annual average rate of 7.8 percent between 1972 to 
1993), in a cross country perspective it is still modest.  Pakistan’s total long term debt in 
1992 was 57 percent below what one might expect it to be given its per capita GDP (in 
purchasing power parity terms) and population.
3 However, other than this, there is little 
encouraging that can be said about the current change in Pakistan’s debt situation and 
about how the terms on which Pakistan receives aid over time have changed.   
Concessional aid as a percentage of the total has declined, the average interest rate 
has increased, the maturity period has decreased, the net transfer has decreased and the 
grant element has decreased.  Thus Pakistan’s debt, the debt/GDP ratio, debt/export ratio 
and debt-service ratio have increased, particularly since 1987-88 when the more intensive 
phase of the structural adjustment period started. In the summary tables below, we 
present evidence to back these statements. Our analysis here covers the period 1972-73 to 
1992-93.
4 


















Aid as a % of 
Total 
1972-73 to 1976-77  4  na  28  48  73 
1977-78 to 1987-88  5  11.2  27  42  69 
1988-89 to 1992-93  5  6.7  22  37  56 
Source:  World Debt Tables, World Bank. 
Notes:  @    = LIBOR for one year $ deposits (International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1994, IMF, 
Washington, D. C., p. 96). 
2To meet space requirements, the details of the analysis and tables are not reported, but are 
available on request from the author.  
3This result is based on the fitted value and residual of a cross-country regression using a sample of 
49 LDCs, with long term debt as the dependent variable and population, population squared and GDP in 
purchasing power parity terms as predictor variables. 





aid over time have worsened across the board.  The average maturity period of loans, 
grant element in loans and concessional aid as a percentage of the total have all 
declined. The average interest rate on which loans are contracted increased by one 
percentage point at a time when market interest rates were declining.  Thus in the 1988-
89 to 1992-93 period, the loans are contracted at only two percent below the market 
interest rate down from 6 percent below in the 1977-78 to 1987-88 period. 
With the worsening of the terms of the debt, one would expect the debt ratios to 
rise and debt indicators to worsen, particularly when the debt stock was increasing.  
This is evident from Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2 










( Billion $) 
Average 
Net Transfer as 




( Billion $s) 
1972-73 to 1976-77  57    0.21  0.51  5.08  6.8 
1977-78 to 1987-88  42    0.20  0.16  0.87  13.9 
1988-89 to 1992-93  48    0.24  0.14  0.30  20.4 
Source:  World Bank,  World Debt Tables. 
Notes:  @ = End period is the last year of the period in question. For-example, for the 1972-73–1976-77 
period, the end period year is 1976-77.  For trended variables, such as debt, end-period numbers 
rather than period averages often give a better picture of the existing situation and how it has 
changed over time. 
 
The debt-GNP ratio was exceptionally high in the 1970s, partly due to lower 
GNP growth rates.  It rose 6 percent since 1988-89, which represents the start of the 
intensive bouts of structural adjustment, compared to the earlier sub-period.  While debt 
has been steadily mounting (from $6.8 billion in 1977 to $20.4 billion in 1993), the net 
transfer (gross-inflows minus principal and interest payments) has rapidly declined.   
Thus, it declined from a substantive 5.1 percent of GNP in the 1972-73–1976-77 period 
to 0.3 of one percent in 1988-89–1992-93 period.   
Sustainable debt management is possible if the likely trajectory of resource 
inflows will exceed or at least converge on the likely trajectory of resource outflows. 
The important outflows are imports and debt servicing and the important inflows are 
exports and remittances.  Based on these flows, we compared debt servicing with the 
sum of remittances and export revenues minus the import bill. As a percentage of the 
GNP, this sum amounted to a negative 32.9 percent in the first period (1972-73–1976-
77), improved to 3.10 percent (due to remittances) in the second period (1977-78–1987-
88) but worsened again to 24.9 percent in the third period (1978-79–1992-93). The 
worsening of this inflow/outflow balance resulted from both a decline in remittances 
and the worsening of the balance of trade.  The result is that Pakistan is now in a non-Shahrukh Rafi Khan  950 
sustainable situation with regards to managing its debt comfortably. 
Given this analysis and the changing terms under which Pakistan is receiving 
aid, there is every likelihood that the debt/GDP ratio will continue to rise. Pakistan is in 
an all too familiar situation—as the country’s dependence on foreign aid increases, the 
terms and conditions of aid inflows are becoming all the more stringent. Not only does 
debt repayment threaten to become “an exchange rate drag” in perpetuity,
5 the 
conditionality under which aid has been received since the later 1980s has also become 
more extensive and more stringent.
6  The total debt and debt ratios should be expected 
to improve over time if the aid, as the original theory suggested, enhanced growth and 
enabled the debt to be retired. 
 
3.  FINDINGS 
We used two simple approaches to test the association of aid and output.
7 The 
first was to test for the Granger causality between aid and economic growth.
8 The 
second was to estimate the association of aid on economic growth in a standard growth 
model and rigorously test, via a sensitivity analysis proposed and used by Levine and 
Renalt (1992), to see if the coefficient of aid was robust.   
The result of the Granger causality tests indicated that higher GDP did not 
Granger cause higher aid but that aid negatively Granger caused GDP.  This finding 
was not sensitive to the lag-length and suggested that a ten percent increase in aid is 
associated with a 0.4 percent decline in GDP.   
The results from estimating the growth equation support these findings.  We added 
subsets of the conditioning variables (two variables at a time) to the base regression equation 
with capital, labour and aid and estimated twenty-one augmented growth equations.
9  These 
conditioning variables include size of exports as a percentage of GDP as a proxy for 
openness, foreign direct investment, inflation, size of industry, terms of trade, age 
dependency ratio and total debt stock as a percentage of GDP.  We found aid to have a 
negative and highly significant coefficient irrespective of the conditioning variable 
combination used.
10 Also, the base aid-output elasticity coefficient was 0.04. This elasticity 
5By this we mean that Pakistan will continue to have to push export growth, which gives a articular 
slant to the economy, and turn over the foreign exchange earnings as debt repayment. 
6See chapter five of eds. Banuri, Khan and Mahmood (1997) for an account of these onditionalities 
and their social and economic impact. 
7Our interest is in the impact of aid, as an aggregate variable, on economic growth.  This is because 
policy leverage is conditional on the sum of loan and grant aid.  Nonetheless, we also explored the separate 
impact of grants (with and without technical assistance) on economic growth.  We explored the robustness of 
the association between aid and economic growth and not the channels via which aid can affect growth.  
Mosley, Hudson and Horrel (1987) model the channels via which aid can influence growth.   
8Granger (1969). 
9We used two conditioning variables at a time because of the small sample. 
10The results of the base regression were much weaker when only grants (with or without technical 
assistance) was used instead of the aid variable. Also, the results were much weaker when aid was included in 





varied from a high of 0.06 to a low of 0.03.  The sensitivity test showed  that our finding of a 
negative and significant association of aid with growth was robust.
11 Nevertheless, due to 
the small sample size, we can only view these results as suggestive. 
The debt/GDP ratio was not a robust variable. Fry (1992) showed that the 
debt/GDP ratio in excess of 50 percent has a negative impact on economic growth due 
to capital flight and a decline in the quantity and efficiency of investment.
12  
While we did not have data to estimate sector production functions, we were able 
to correlate project aid to the agricultural and industrial sectors with output in these 
sectors for the period 1972-73 to 1987-88.  These sectors combined accounted for about 
a third of total cumulative project aid over this period, with industry drawing about 
double the amount drawn by agriculture.
13 Both partial correlation coefficients were 
very low and insignificant when aid was used as a contemporaneous variable.  Aid 
lagged one period had a positive correlation with the agricultural sector (.48) which was 
significant at the 10 percent level but with industry it was negative (–.37) and 
insignificant.
14 While the agricultural coefficient is positive, as a partial correlation 
coefficient it is low and only weakly significant.  Thus there is little support for aid 
effectiveness even with sectoral disaggregation. 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
There is little about the aid/debt scenario for Pakistan that is positive. With the 
intensive period of structural adjustment in the late 1980s, the debt/GDP ratio and the 
debt service/export ratio rose compared to the mid-1970s to late 1980s period. 
Concessional aid as a percentage of the total has fallen, the average interest rate is 
higher, the maturity period is lower and the grant element is lower.  Thus not only is 
Pakistan heavily in debt, but also, the changing terms of the debt are going to make it 
much harder to get out of the debt trap. 
The harsher terms on which Pakistan gets aid make the debt trap more 
formidable as does the economics of the aid-growth nexus. At first, our findings about 
the negative Granger causal effect of aid on GDP and the statistically robust negative 
impact of aid on economic growth may appear odd.  In fact, one could argue that these 
results imply that Pakistan would be progressively better off the more of its resources it 
gifted to another country. But such an argument represents a fundamental 
misunderstanding about the nature of aid.  Aid represents a package including policy 
parameters such as prescriptions about fiscal, trade and exchange rate policy.  Had these 
policies suited Pakistan’s economic environment, aid would have positively impacted 
11An advantage of the co-integration analysis which we utilised is that it helped in avoiding spurious 
results. 
12See Table 1 for Pakistan’s debt/GDP ratio. 
13Cassen et al. (1990), Annex, Tables and Bibliography, Table 10-z. 
14The contemporaneous and one period lagged aid correlation coefficient was .32 (p = .23) and 
.48 (p = .07)  with agricultural output and –.14 (p = .59) and –.36 (p = .18)  with industrial output.  Shahrukh Rafi Khan  952 
GDP growth.  Another way of looking at this is to expect the debt/GDP ratio to fall if 
aid was really successful.  Table 2 shows that while this ratio declined in the late-1970s 
to the late 1980s, it rose again from the late 1980s to the early 1990s reflecting 
Pakistan’s inability to retire its debt.  Co-incidently, this represents a period of intensive 
structural adjustment. There are several factors that could neutralise the effectiveness of 
aid.  Aid goes to the public sector and blockages, inefficiency, misuse and leakage are 
likely to reduce the effectiveness in the use of these resources as is the case with other 
public sector expenditures. Additional reasons identified in the literature include project 
selections biased towards prestigious but economically unsound large projects, foreign 
exchange intensive projects and infrastructure rather than productive projects.
15 The 
lack of government-donor and intra-donor co-ordination could similarly reduce the 
effectiveness of aid.
16  As is well known, much aid returns to the country of origin in the 
form of expensive consulting contracts.
17 Similarly, the effectiveness of aid can be 
reduced by “tying” agreements calling for the purchase of equipment and materials 
from donors at costs much more than cheaper alternatives of similar quality.
18 
The above factors explain why aid may not be as effective as it might otherwise 
be.  For the negative association, one can turn to the earlier literature on the negative aid 
saving association.  This literature has been reviewed in detail in the surveys by Ridell 
(1987) and White (1992) referred to earlier.  Prominent advocates of this negative 
association include Griffen and Enos (1970) and Weisskopf (1972).   Using a two stage 
least square model with growth estimated in the first stage and the fitted growth used in 
a saving function in the second stage, we also identified a negative association of 
official transfers and the saving rate between the 1971 and 1990 period.  However, the 
magnitude of the effect was extremely small and, besides that, the saving equation was 
not cointegrated. 
In general, the negative aid-saving association may be one of the channels 
explaining the negative aid-growth association.  However, other factors have also been 
identified in the literature as possible explanations. That there is a short-run 
recessionary impact of adjustment policies is unlikely to be questioned by any 
economist. In addition, aid and debt leads to a destructive “foreign exchange drag”. As 
noted by [Cassen et al. (1990), p. 1.16], debt repayment represents an outflow of free 
standing foreign exchange in contrast to the conditional and tied inflow of foreign 
exchange that aid represents.  Further, foreign exchange, relatively easily available in 
the short run, can induce the “dutch disease” syndrome (making exports non-
competitive due to the artificial appreciation of the exchange rate).  Finally, the negative 
15[Ridell (1987), pp. 114]. 
16[Cassen et al. (1990)]. 
17[Cassen et al. (1990), p. 2A.9] report that consulting draws away about 10 percent of all aid in 
Pakistan. 
18[Cassen et al. (1990), p. 1.50] speculate, based on the findings of an earlier study, that “tying” 





impact of commodity aid on local production has been discussed in the literature.
19 
Surprisingly, the notion of aid to the public sector inducing inefficiency by 
providing a soft-budget constraint has not been discussed in the literature.  This 
concept was originated by Kornoi (1986) and is widely viewed as an important 
explanatory factor in the failing of socialist economies. The extension of this concept 
to aid-recipient governments seems quite self-evident, and this may be the most 
important explanatory factor in explaining the negative growth-aid association. 
The public choice literature which discusses inefficient rent-seeking and 
empire building also provides a rationale for this association in so far as aid enables 
inefficient administrative structures to survive. The realisation for the need for 
accountable government has not yet translated into effective institutional reform. 
The reasoning above and our findings show that it is possible to rule out the 
counter factual that matters may have been even worse without aid.  Given the 
negative Granger causal effect of aid on GDP and the robust negative and significant 
statistical association of growth and aid, one can only expect Pakistan to get more 
and more indebted.  As earlier mentioned, our method explores an aggregate 
association. Our findings thus are not inconsistent with the existence of effective 
(where the benefits out-weigh the costs) donor programmes and projects initiated by 
bilateral and multilateral aid agencies.
20 Also, it is possible that we have identified a 
negative association in the “second phase” of aid receiving whereas in the “first 
phase” of aid receiving, on more generous terms, the infrastructure basis of later 
growth may have been established. 
If aid in the aggregate sense is “bad”, why does Pakistan continue to solicit it? 
 While aid may have a negative impact on the economy, it could benefit at least some 
of those who decide whether or not to solicit it. Even if one can rule out overt vested 
interests, aid represents the path of least resistance. Policy-makers in Pakistan jump 
from managing one crisis to the next one and grasp at whatever straws they can in the 
process, no matter how harmful they are in the long run.  Furthermore, sensible long 
run policies are not avoided because they inflict pain on the poor. Pakistan’s policy-
makers have shown themselves quite adept at testing these limits.  Sensible long run 
policies are avoided because they inflict pain on the elites.   
The only alternative to aid is to raise revenues internally and to institute just 
economies in expenditures.  But this would mean sensible long run policies like tax 
reform, including closing exemptions and other tax loopholes, asking legislators to 
start taxing their agricultural incomes and the cutting of luxurious expenditures by 
19Commodity aid was about a quarter of total non-military aid in 1987-88, the latest year for 
which such disaggregated data are available. [Cassen et al. (1990), Annex, Tables and Bibliography, 
Tables 2z and 6z]. 
20For examples, see Cassen et al. (1990), pp. 1.12–1.22. Shahrukh Rafi Khan  954 
politicians and the civil and military bureaucracies at state expense. The issue of 
peace and cutting the military budget has also been raised many times by others. This 
and other economies are now more necessary than ever. 
 
REFERENCES 
Banuri, T., S. R. Khan, and M.  Mahmood (eds) (1997) Just Development: Protecting 
the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
Cassen, R., and Associates (1986) Does Aid Work? New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
Cassen, R., A. Duncun, S. Guisinger, E. Hooper, and O. Noman (1990) The 
Effectiveness of Aid to Pakistan. Islamabad: Economic Affairs Division. Pakistan 
and UNDP. 
Chishti, S., and M. A. Khan (1992) Foreign Aid, Defence Expenditure and Public 
Investment in Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review 31:4  895–908. 
Edwards, S. (1993) Openness, Trade Liberalisation and Growth in Developing 
Countries. Journal of Economic Literature 31: 1358–1393. 
Fry, M. J. (1992) Some Stabilising and Destabilising Effects of Foreign Debt 
Accumulation in Developing Countries. Economic Letters 39: 315–321. 
Granger, C. W. J. (1969) Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Methods and 
Cross-sectoral Methods. Econometrica 37:  424–438. 
Griffen, K. B., and J. L. Enos (1970) Foreign Assistance, Objectives, and 
Consequences, Economic Development and Cultural Change 18:  313–327. 
International Monetary Fund (1994) International Financial Statistics. Washington, D. 
C.: IMF. 
Levine, R., and D. Renelt (1992) A Sensitivity Analysis of Cross-country Growth 
Regressions. American Economic Review 82:  942–963. 
Kemal, A. R. (1992) Self-reliance and Implications for Growth and Resource 
Mobilisations. The Pakistan Development Review 31:4  1101–1110. 
Khan, N. Z., and E. Rahim (1993) Foreign Aid, Domestic Saving and Economic 
Growth, 1960–1988. The Pakistan Development Review 32:4  1157–1167. 
Kornai, J. (1986) The Soft Budget Constraint. Kyklos 39:  3–30.  
McGillivray, M., H. White, and A. Ahmed (1994) Evaluating the Effectiveness of 
Structural Adjustment Policies on Macroeconomic Performance: A Review of the 
Evidence with Special Reference to Pakistan. Paper prepared for presentation at 
AERC/Goethe Conference on Political and Socioeconomic Consequences of Policy-
based Lending, Karachi.  
Mosley, P., J. Hudson, and S. Horrell (1987) Aid, the Public Sector, and the Market in 
Less Developed Countries. Economic Journal 97:  616–641. 
Ridell, R. C. (1987) Foreign Aid Reconsidered. London: Johns Hopkins 





Sims, C. A. (1972) Money, Income, and Causality. American Economic Review 62: 
540–552.  
Weisskopf, T. E. (1972) The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflows on Domestic Saving in 
Underdeveloped Countries. Journal of International Economics 2:  25–38. 
White, H. (1992) The Macroeconomic Impact of Development Aid: A Critical Survey. 





The paper presented by Shahrukh Rafi Khan addresses the most important 
economic problem Pakistan is facing currently. The question he has raised is whether 
foreign aid is useful or detrimental to economic growth in Pakistan. Using standard 
regression analysis, the author shows that growth in foreign aid in a year results in 
reduced rate of economic growth in the same year. The results also show that the 
negative effect of the growth rate of aid on the GDP growth rate is not very sensitive 
to various conditioning variables included in the regression equation, one at a time. 
These results are in sharp contrast to the traditional view that foreign aid 
contributes to economic growth. The author provides several convincing arguments 
to explain the negative association between aid and growth. One of the main 
arguments is that aid can contribute to economic growth when it is assumed that 
parameters of the economy remain unchanged. Since aid is usually contracted as a 
package that includes specific policy prescriptions, such an assumption is unrealistic. 
According to the author, some other factors that can neutralise the contribution of aid 
to economic growth include mismanagement, inefficiency, and leakages in the 
utilisation and allocation of aid. Thus, the paper does an excellent job in explaining 
the results and concludes that the presumed positive contribution of foreign aid to 
economic growth is based on misperceived assumptions that do not hold in reality. 
While the paper addresses the core issue of the current debt problem in 
Pakistan and the conclusions reached are plausible, I have a few observations on the 
way the relationship between aid and growth is structured in the theoretical part of 
the paper. As the author has mentioned in the introduction, the relationship between 
aid and growth is quite complicated. The model developed in the paper, however, 
does not provide sufficient theoretical underpinnings that can be linked to the 
observations. In my opinion, the econometric approach adopted in the paper is 
inappropriate to address the problem at hand. 
Whether aid is good or bad for the economy is an inter-temporal problem. 
When the focal point of analysis is economic growth, the relationship could be 
framed in a better way around a dynamic structure. This is how the literature treats 
the problem. The traditional dynamic models of, for example, Kemp and Hamada or 
the gap models can be easily modified to consider the effects of changing parameters 
(for example, due to inefficiency or policy prescriptions) on the relationship between 
aid and growth. Using a straight-line relationship between aid and growth can at best 
be a crude approximation. 
An alternative framework of analysis could be to trace the effect of aid 
injections on the time paths of the key parameters that affect the savings rate and Comments  957
productivity and then determine the effect of the latter on the time path of growth 
rate. Such an analysis is more likely to expose the complex relationship between aid 
and growth. For example, one can determine the timing of the turning-points when 
the nature of the relationship is altered in a fundamental way. 
Despite the above observations, it is difficult to understate the contribution of 
this paper to the understanding of a complex problem. An important contribution of 
the paper is that, despite being a quantitative exercise, it relates the results with some 
of the well-known qualitative issues relating to aid, which are often discussed but 
seldom incorporated in formal economic modelling exercises. 
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